FUKUSHIMAプロジェクト委

水野博之・山口栄一・西村吉雄・河合弘之・飯尾俊二・仲森智博・川口盛之助・本田康二郎


FUKUSHIMA Project (f-pj.org) clarified true cause of the TEPCO nuclear plant accident, for the first time, and is about to publish the English report of accident analysis.

 Criminal error in TEPCO management of technology and damages given to "Brand Japan" –


Eiichi YAMAGUCHI, D.Sc., Chairman of the Fukushima Project Committee Professor of Doshisha University

Morinosuke KAWAGUCHI, Member of the Fukushima Project Committee Associate Director for Arthur D. Little (Japan), Inc


Existence of the "Last Fort"



Water Level of No.3 Reactor



Water Level of No.2 Reactor



Dr. Hibino's Testimony

When I arrived at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) at 21:00 on March 12, Prime Minister Kan had started to get the feeling that the same thing might possibly happen to reactors No.2 and No.3 as No.1. And, Kan has frequently instructed that TEPCO should forestall the situation. However, TEPCO stalled the vents and sea water injection with the reason that the RCIC was still working.

So, on the grounds that there was still working cooling system in place, they chose to delay opening the vent and inject sea water into the reactor vessels.

The Prime Minister Kan asserted that even if we were to say that the RCIC had indeed been functioning as intended, (as there was no heat coming out of the containment area), we can infer that the heat and pressure more than likely continued to gradually build up as it had nowhere to escape. Which is exactly why they should have quickly opened up the vents and inject sea water into the reactors immediately to cool down the out of control reactors. However, TEPCO refused.

We proved:

- 1. The final cooling system, RCIC and HPCI of No.3 and RCIC of No.2 Nuclear Reactor were correctly operated even without AC power even though Tsunami had destroyed the emergency power system.
- 2. Therefore, the No.3 and No.2 nuclear reactors were in controllable states, while the final cooling system were operated (35 hours for No.3, and 70 hours for No.2). If TEPCO opened the vent and injected the sea water during the controllable dimension, the reactors would never be out of control. Then, the radiation pollution produced by No. 3 could be avoided.
- 3. However, in reality, the management of TEPCO kept refusing the sea water injection, although TEPCO could inject the sea water during the controllable dimension.
- 4. The reason why the management refused it is that they cannot understand the "Physics Limit" of nuclear reactor.
- 5. The occurrence of the uncontrollable situation was 100% predictable while the final cooling system was operated. Thus, the root cause of this accident is NOT the technology BUT the technology management. The criminal liability of the TEPCO management cannot be escaped.

We published

FUKUSHIMA Report - Root Cause of the Nuclear Plant Accident!

The assertion is completely different from that of any other investigation commissions including ICANPS (Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations: Chair=Dr. Yotaro Hatamura) and Minkan Jikocho (Chair=Dr. Koichi Kitazawa), as shown in this presentation.

Here, In order to publish the analysis report without any ideological bias, FUKUSHIMA Project experimentally raised funds from any citizens for publication. More than 3 million yen have been donated for eight months, so that the Project was able to publish the report, by unit price of 900 yen, entitled "FUKUSHIMA Report—Root Cause of the Nuclear Plant Accident" on January 30, 2012.

We have also accomplished English translation, and is looking for a suitable publisher of the English version. Section 1.1 of Chapter 1 is at your desk.